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Section 2: Paper 3
Ask the philosopher: practical advice and self-help in antiquity and today
Dimitrios Dentsoras
University of Manitoba
Introduction
Philosophers do not have much of a reputation for being practical people. Neither did
they have any such reputation in the days of philosophy’s infancy, if we are to believe Plato’s
anecdote from the life of Thales, the “first of the philosophers.” According to it, Thales once fell
in a well while walking and gazing at the stars, earning the ridicule of a slave girl standing
nearby.1 Plato also tells us that, in his own days, most people thought of philosophers as goodfor-nothings who could not take care of their own lives, let alone the lives of others. 2 This is to a
great extent a consequence of the multitude’s lack of philosophical understanding. But
philosophers seem to have done quite a bit to earn popular disdain, by advancing the most
outlandish views, and by focusing on the most impractical (and hopelessly irresolvable)
questions.
Yet, we also find out that ancient kings and emperors often brought philosophers with
them while campaigning, and discussed with them a wide array of professional and very personal
matters in times of peace.3 In fact, some of our finest surviving literature on moral philosophy
can be found in treatises and letters, such as those of Epictetus and Seneca, which aimed at
providing philosophical advice to well-educated philosophical laymen who found themselves in
the midst of a personal crisis, usually caused by the loss of a beloved person, exile, or a
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professional failure. This practical and personal aspect of philosophy, which had all but
disappeared in the period since Marcus Aurelius, has been enjoying a survival in the form of
philosophical practice, a discipline aiming at using philosophical reasoning in order to help
people overcome a wide range of personal issues, from minor anxieties to the truly disruptive
emotional outbreaks. Nevertheless, the majority of academic philosophical works, even those
discussing so-called ‘practical ethics,’ still approach their subject from a detached theoretical
standpoint, often not really expecting the reader to act out their recommendation – which is, after
all, a theoretical conclusion. And even in cases where there is some concrete position on an
existing moral or practical issue, the advice is most of the times general, not really addressing the
specific needs of a specific person. This detached and generalizing feature of philosophy is what
contemporary philosophical practitioners try to amend, modeling their methods and advice on
the personalized practice of psychotherapy and counselling.
This paper examines the genre of practical philosophical treatises in antiquity, contrasting
it with contemporary literature in philosophical practice. Its main focus concerns the role of the
philosopher as a guide to practical everyday concerns and the relationship between theoretical
and practical ethics. An important question for ancient works on practical philosophy (and to a
lesser extent their contemporary equivalents) has to do with whether, and to what extent,
adopting the philosopher’s advice also requires an adoption of that person’s broader
philosophical framework (Stoicism, Neoplatonism, Skepticism, etc.). Philosophers tend to put
heavy emphasis on the existence of a broader philosophical theory that coheres logically with the
practical advice a philosopher may offer. This emphasis is clearly reduced in contemporary
works on practical philosophy. I discuss some evident advantages of the ancient philosophical
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approach in connecting theoretical principles with practical advice, and conclude with some
thoughts on how philosophers might write popular works on practical philosophy nowadays.

Practical philosophy in antiquity
Our ancient sources uniformly credit Socrates for being the first person to shift
philosophical inquiry from contemplation of the physical world and its origin towards human
nature and action. In this way, Socrates introduced the questions that would become central in
moral philosophy. What is the ultimate purpose of human action? What kinds of actions are most
profitable from a personal standpoint, and which for society as a whole? What are the benefits of
morality? In asking these and other similar questions, Socrates did not merely aim at
constructing a moral theory. Rather, as he proclaims in Plato’s Apology, the aim was to change
the way in which his fellow Athenian citizens led their lives.4 Moreover, if are to believe some of
Socrates’ followers, such as the historian and adventurer Xenophon, the scope of Socrates’ moral
and practical interests were rather broad, ranging well beyond what a modern philosopher would
consider ethics, to include advice about hygiene, household management, etc.5 But there was a
unique element to Socrates’ approach to practical questions, which set him apart from sophists,
orators, and politicians, rendering his advice and admonitions distinctly philosophical. This
uniqueness of Socrates’ practical advice has to do with the primacy of rational argument. Rather
than employing rhetorical strategies or appealing to established moral and religious beliefs,
Socrates seems intent on offering practical advice by employing rational argument and little else.
This strategy has two important consequences. On the one hand, it deepens the level of
analysis to expose a bedrock of basic metaphysical, epistemological, and psychological
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principles. Without taking any social moral conventions for granted, the moral and practical
views of Socrates, and his future followers, had to be grounded on a foundational philosophical
theory. Socrates, of course, never completed such a foundational work. But he did provide a
number of insights, which led to the second consequence of his philosophical practical advice.
This is the radical nature of the moral views and corresponding advice. Persistently, up until his
final demise, Socrates confronted the Athenian populace, from the most illustrious to the most
humble, and implored them to abandon their pursuit of money and fame in favour of a life of
moral goodness and knowledge, primarily of their own selves.
Socrates’ example, both as a philosopher and as a social critic and moralist, looms large
in the philosophical schools that dominated the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Stoics,
Epicureans, Platonists, and Pyrrhonian Skeptics engaged in a series of heated moral debates,
presenting and defending a wide range of ethical views and practical advice. But they also shared
some common conceptions regarding the purpose of philosophy and its connection to life. One
such common conception had to do with philosophy’s goal. Rather than a merely theoretical
enterprise, philosophy was seen by the Hellenistic schools as a “craft of life,” analogous to other
crafts, such as medicine or carpentry, whose goal was to bring about the happy life, just as
medicine and carpentry aim at restoring health or making a table.
On the other hand, many of the Hellenistic schools saw philosophy as an intellectual
discipline that demanded a long and challenging education.6 Rather than being open to the
public, as Socrates’ impromptu discussions were, philosophy became an “academic” discipline
under the Hellenistic schools. The promise of the schools was that a thorough philosophical
training would not only provide one with some sort of practical knowledge, but would also
prepare one for living a virtuous and fruitful – in other words, happy – life. In order for this to be
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achieved, one had to undergo instruction on a wide spectrum of philosophical questions, logical,
metaphysical, psychological, etc.7 In the course of this instruction, the foundational tenets of
each school were presented and defended. These included doctrines in physics (e.g. Stoic and
Epicurean materialism), theology (e.g. the notion of Stoic divine providence), or psychology
(e.g. the Platonic tripartition of the soul). In addition, membership in a Hellenistic school also
required living a specified kind of life, with strict rules about practical matters, such as dietary
habits, (e.g. Epicurean vegetarianism), or exercises aiming at eliminating emotions (in the case
of the Stoics), or even beliefs (in the case of the Skeptics).8
How did the Hellenistic philosophical schools relate to non-philosophers? Did they have
any practical impact on their lives? Judging from the structure and operation of the philosophical
schools, there seems to have been little concern with non-philosophers, or desire for making an
impact on their lives. With only some exceptions, such as the public lectures of the Stoics, or the
occasional member of the Cynics making an outrageous display of his anti-conventional morals
in the streets of Athens, the Hellenistic philosophical schools were rather secluded. These seem
to be two main reasons for this stark contrast between the extensive practical guidance for
members of a school and the exclusion from public engagement. The first is the schools’
insistence on the wholesale adoption of their metaphysical, epistemological and moral doctrines.
One could not be a Stoic with respect to moral theory without also being a metaphysical
materialist and an epistemological dogmatist, for example. Related to this was the fact that study
in the Hellenistic schools was a lengthy and rigorous process that did not offer much of a
professional or social reward.
To this, one had to add the fact that many of the Hellenistic schools also required
adherence to strict practical and moral rules. The schools promised a happy life to their students,
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but what they aimed at was their particular conception of happiness, and not at the happiness
that the young men who entered the schools may have had in mind originally (professional
success, public recognition, etc.). This is most clearly evident in cases such as Stoicism, which
required the complete rejection of all emotions and proclaimed that one is condemned to live an
utterly unhappy life until the final stage of apatheia can be reached.9 A similar all-or-nothing
strategy was also adopted by the Skeptics, who proclaimed that a happy state of imperturbance
(ataraxia) could only follow complete suspension of judgment.
Given the evidently exclusive character of the philosophical schools and their stark
rejection of popular morality and practises, it is rather surprising that philosophers enjoyed a
high repute through the Hellenistic period and all the way up to the Roman imperial times. While
philosophers remained politically insignificant,10 and were often treated as intellectual curiosities
whose moral views should be taken with reservation,11 their presence in their higher social
circles was considered an indication of, if not a requirement for, intellectual refinement. Part of
philosophy’s popularity, no doubt, was due to the genius of Plato, Aristotle, and other popular
philosophers whose books adorned the shelves of bookstores in Athens.12 But a second, and
perhaps more important, role was played by a gradual yet noticeable shift from the intellectually
complex and almost impracticable doctrines of the Hellenistic schools towards a more commonsense version of philosophical theories that offered achievable, and often personal, advice for
real-life situations.
The popularization of moral philosophy during the Roman period coincides to some
extent with the rise of philosophical dilettantism and eclecticism. Rather than committing to a
single philosophical school’s doctrines (including its metaphysical, epistemological, and moral
tenets), well-educated Romans with a soft-spot for philosophical discourse felt free to construct
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their own philosophical theories by combining the doctrines from each philosophical school that
seemed most acceptable.13 Often, the more intellectually demanding parts of philosophical
theories were left out, both because of their obscurity and also (and, perhaps, more importantly)
because they did not have any clear application to practical questions that the philosophical
dilettantes were mostly concerned with.
Similarly, one notices a diluting of the practical demands that different philosophical
theories make. Rather than insisting on the complete eradication of emotion that the Stoic
Chrysippus demanded,14 later Stoics suggest a mere “lessening” of emotions, while still allowing
for their existence. Similarly, the strict lifestyle of Epicureans was replaced with practical advice
that focused more on enjoying pleasures than enduring pains with equanimity. Often, the
arguments for this “light” practical advice were based on non-philosophical practical concerns,
rather than logical coherence with basic metaphysical or moral beliefs. For example, Chrysippus
prohibited mourning for the death of a beloved person on the basis of the fact that death is not an
evil but rather something indifferent (which itself was a claim that followed from Stoic
metaphysical and theological views). Later writers, on the other hand, accept that some mourning
is acceptable and even appropriate, but point to the fact that it should never get out of control, to
the extent of disrupting one’s life and psychological well-being.15
A cursory look at the themes that dominate the moral treatises of the Roman period
demonstrates a concern with practical issues that concern everyone, and not only philosophers.
How to deal with death, both of those around me and – eventually – of myself? How can I
combat anxiety and excessive ambition? How can I make friends and be liked by others? How
can I make my life happier and more content? These are, of course, questions that earlier
philosophers had also discussed. But in Roman times, their treatment takes a decisively personal
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tone. This is noticeable in the increased use of the moral epistle, which often addresses a
personal misfortune, such as the death of a beloved person.16 Moreover, one notices an
expanding use of rhetorical techniques that aim at helping non-philosophically trained people
cope with all sorts of practical concerns, from the quotidian to the extraordinary. 17 The success
of the phenomenon of philosophical advice, in the Roman period, seems to have been
considerable, leading to the expansion of the practice from philosophers, such as Seneca, to
philosophically trained professionals, such as the orator Cicero, the historian Plutarch, or the
doctors Galen and Sextus Empiricus.
Given the never-ending popular need for advice and desire for help with personal
difficulties, one may wonder what accounts for the popularity of practical philosophy, rather than
some other kind of practical advice in antiquity. What weight did being a philosopher add in
writing works on practical ethics? What did it bring to the table? Some answers to this question
are given by Cicero, himself not a professional philosopher, but someone who was concerned
with practical questions throughout his life and decided to devote the last part of his life to the
study of philosophy.18 As Cicero notes, it is certainly not the fact that philosophers possess the
truth about moral and practical matters that sets them apart. After all, the obvious difference of
opinion among philosophers should be a clear indication that they do not possess a factual
expertise the way that doctors and builders do. On the other hand, the moral and practical advice
of philosophers, varied as it may be, is superior to that of others, for a number of reasons. The
most evident is that philosophers have a comprehensive view of different moral opinions, unlike
perhaps other specialists, and have devoted a long time to thinking seriously about moral and
practical questions. Moreover, philosophers, and philosophers alone, validate their practical
advice by placing it within a general moral framework, rather than taking for granted moral
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beliefs from a variety of sources (laws and customs, popular beliefs, etc.), as other professionals
do (clearly so, in the case of politicians and orators).
The philosophical practical advice that Cicero and other thinkers of the Roman period
offered was often tailored to the needs of an elite that was too busy or indolent to engage in
lengthy metaphysical debates. In some cases the philosophical practical advice was accompanied
by short summaries of the relevant philosophical positions, perhaps even a “suggested readings”
list. Cicero, for example, supplements his practical advice and words of encouragement about
dealing with the fear of death in his Tusculan disputations by presenting a survey of
philosophical opinions on the nature of the soul, presumably with the thought that knowing what
the soul is would give us a better idea on what the proper response to death is. But he does not
insist on any particular psychological theory. Philosophical eclecticism, after all, would allow
one to pick philosophical theories from any school, in order to come up with practical advice that
often amounted to little more than common sense, combined with a watered-down version of
some broad philosophical doctrines.
Despite its popularity during the Roman period, philosophical practical advice was
eventually replaced by a wholly new sort of practical guidance: Christianity. With the spread of
the new faith, philosophy lost its claim to being “medicine of the soul”19 to a new set of souldoctors, namely Christian priests and saints. In many respects, the practical advice of the
Christian priests did not differ much from that of pagan philosophical precursors. But
Christianity offered, in addition, what philosophical advice had gradually renounced in the past
centuries, namely a greater narrative and a foundational theory of the world. The Christian
narrative did not possess, at least on the surface, the demanding complexity and sophistication of
the Hellenistic philosophical theories, making it much more intelligible. On this narrative of the
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Creation, the Incarnation, and the Kingdom of Heaven (and all the episodes in between),
Christianity built a nexus of practical advice and rules covering all aspects of human life.
Practical advice and self-help today
An ocean of technological, social, and intellectual developments separates us from the
Roman aristocrats seeking philosophical advice, or from simple people of the Middle Ages
asking their local priest for spiritual and practical guidance in dealing with the hardships of life.
Yet very little has changed regarding the need for personal advice and guidance itself. If
anything, the need seems ever-increasing, given the burgeonng, multibillion market for
professional practical advice, from psychological counselling to self-help books. No longer the
realm of religious guidance, our anxieties, challenges, insecurities, and overall bafflement about
the meaning of it all, are open to a wide range of professionals and self-proclaimed experts, who
are willing to offer their advice, and make a living from it.
While a large part of the treatment of personal hardships and psychological conditions
occurs within the regulated confines of modern-day “medicine of the soul”—psychotherapy--and
its related disciplines, an ever-increasing number of people are seeking new, alternative, methods
for dealing with life’s challenges, from the minor to the disruptive. This is testified by a
ballooning market for self-help books, lectures, and workshops.20 In the case of selfimprovement books, two groups of authors dominate the field currently. One group is comprised
of best-selling psychologists, who have adapted their academic research and made its main
features available to (relatively well-educated) non-experts.21 Their works on popular science are
mostly concerned with defending a particular psychological theory concerning the causes of
anxieties and happiness.22 Some of these expert-written books present methods for dealing with
one’s own difficulties (although they suggest that professional personal advice and help should
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be sought, also). Others are more theoretical and avoid providing any concrete advice, focusing
mostly on presenting a particular science-illuminated worldview.
The second, and more successful in terms of readership, group of self-improvement
authors is a heterogeneous collection of self-proclaimed experts and advisers, often people with a
business and sales professional background, as well as spiritual gurus and advisers.23 Their books
focus, as expected, on concrete practical advice about how to deal with a large array of personal
challenges – challenges that, to some extent, everyone faces in their everyday life. These popular
self-help books display significant variation in sophistication and concreteness. But some general
features appear almost universally, defining to some extent the self-help book genre in the case
of non-scientifically expert authors.
One almost universal feature of such books is the frequent use of real-life examples,
parallel to narrations of the authors’ personal experiences. The authors often advertise the fact
that they are not ivy tower academics, and that their books are the product of actually having
gone through the situations they describe (usually, an unhappy life that is turned around), or
coming in contact with people that had such experiences.24 This strategy was also often
employed by moral philosophers of the Roman period. But, while in the case of the Roman
philosophers most examples are taken from the lives of illustrious public men, contemporary
self-help authors mostly use examples of common people, with the obvious intention of
convincing their readers that they could be just like the men and women who managed to turn
their lives around.25 At the same time, self-help writers intermittently refer to examples of
extremely successful people – primarily themselves – with the comment that the readers can also
enjoy a similar success.26
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In general, it would be fair to say that most of the advice offered in popular self-help
books is really not much more than common sense. In fact, it is often presented precisely as
being simple, rather than profound. But, when appropriately implemented, this common-sense
advice is supposed to have impressive and even miraculous effects.27 Through repetitive
observance of a few rules and basic ideas, usually in the form of oft-repeated slogans, the authors
of self-help books promise that we will be able to face our anxieties and fears, feel better about
ourselves, and be more successful in life.28
At this point, one may ask what counts as being successful in life. The answer, usually
given implicitly, is that success is defined by whatever one considers important. If money, love,
and friends are what one wants, this is what following the author’s advice will help them acquire.
If it is a quiet and peaceful life, the same advice can lead to this, too. After all, the advice is not
about what one should want, but about how one could get what one happens to want. In this
respect, contemporary self-help books differ significantly from much of the practical advice
offered by philosophers in antiquity. Rather than adopting a radical moral position and
prompting people to re-evaluate what they consider important in life, as Socrates did,
contemporary self-help gurus merely propose ways in which people can get whatever they
happen to want or make themselves feel better about what they happen to have. This,
undoubtedly, seems rather selfish, and unabashedly so. But it does not differ much from the
approach of psychotherapy, which aims primarily at making people feel better, rather than
making them better people.

Contemporary philosophical practice and counselling
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To the two aforementioned categories of self-help books (those by psychologists and
those by businessmen and gurus), one can add a third. This is the category of self-help books by
philosophers. These are not theoretical books on practical ethics, but books modeled after
psychotherapy, and aiming at providing guidance with respect to a variety of psychological
challenges, from dealing with anxieties, to becoming happy, to finding meaning in one’s life. 29
The authors of these books refer to the discipline as philosophical practice or philosophical
counselling.30 As philosophical practitioners often note, the idea that philosophy could, and
perhaps should, help people deal with everyday challenges, and provide meaning and direction in
their lives, is almost as old as philosophy itself. And, in fact, quite a few recent works on
philosophical practice have sought inspiration from ancient philosophers, such as Socrates,
Aristotle, or the Stoics.31 But how do contemporary works on philosophical practice compare to
ancient works on practical ethics?
A look at the most popular books on philosophical practice, such as Lou Marinoff’s
Plato, Not Prozac, reveals more similarities with contemporary self-improvement books than
with the practical ethics of Roman writers, with the practical moral treatises of the Hellenistic
schools remaining a distant relative. For the most part, works in philosophical practice defend no
particular philosophical theory, but rather paste different ideas from very different theories, in a
manner similar to the eclecticism of some Roman thinkers and amateur philosophers.
Sometimes, works in philosophical practice provide short summaries of diverse philosophical
positions, but make little out of the metaphysical and epistemological foundations of each
theory.32 In most cases, the philosophical foundations are left out altogether, taking historical
moral views as parting points, without providing any account of how they arose. Isolated quotes,
rather than structured philosophical theories, is what the reader primarily receives.33
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With respect to the philosophical advice offered, one notices a clear contrast between the
radicalism of ancient practical ethics and contemporary philosophical counselling. While ancient
philosophers focused on showing their readers that the goals they have set in life are gravely
misdirected and could not be justified by philosophical reflection, contemporary philosophical
counsellors do not challenge the general primary goals of their audience; rather, they aim at
mitigating the effects that perceived personal failures have on the psychological well-being of its
members. There are good practical reasons for this. It is hard to convince someone that money is
completely unimportant and that the death of a beloved person should not be seen as a cause of
unhappiness. It is much easier to simply try to make one’s readers feel less obsessed with
amassing wealth or less depressed by personal misfortune, while admitting these are significant
concerns. But, for the moral philosophers of antiquity, practical concerns took second place to
portraying philosophical truth and constructing a rationally coherent system of beliefs. Socrates’
self-destructive insistence on this principle can only serve as a reminder to this.
What can one say about the nature of the advice one can find in contemporary works on
philosophical practice, then? To a large extent, philosophical practice works seem to be a blend
of folk psychology and common sense, often reminiscent of other, non-philosophical selfimprovement books.34 The general idea they promote is that rational reflection on one’s life and
a its level-headed re-evaluation can help with overcoming one’s problems. Philosophical practice
is primarily forward-looking, offering advice on how to plan for and deal with the future, rather
than overcoming past events. Rationally calculating our actions, philosophical practitioners
maintain, has positive consequences. This seems an obvious common-sense point that anyone
should accept. But, what role does philosophy play in all this? Well, it depends on how one
understands philosophy, the practitioners could reply. For some philosophical practitioners,
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philosophy seems to be a rather loose repository of ideas, pieces of wisdom that one can use in
order to construct one’s own “philosophy” and make one’s life easier. The thread that holds it all
together is critical reasoning, and this is what philosophy presumably supplies.
Of course, this is not how academic philosophers understand philosophy. For most of
them, philosophy is a discipline that aims at telling us something about the world, and not only
an exercise in critical thinking that can be used as a tool for sorting out personal problems.
Surely, the notion of philosophy as critical self-reflection figures prominently in ancient times –
the call for common sense might not be that different from what Socrates tried to do when he
urged Athenians to know themselves. But Socrates also had a broad theory in mind, which
contained radical thoughts such as “it is better to suffer injustice than commit it.” One does not
seem much of this is in contemporary works on philosophical practice.
In conclusion, one could say that, despite the evident need for philosophical advice that
reaches beyond academia and has an effect on the lives of common people, philosophical
counselling still has a way to go towards becoming an established and effective discipline. The
place of philosophical practice is clearly not as an antagonist to the scientific psychotherapeutic
establishment.35 Its primary goal, rather, should be to demonstrate the need for a specifically
philosophical rather than psychoanalytic or merely common sense approach to practical
challenges. But what is a particularly philosophical approach? In answering this question, I
believe we could take a lesson from the development of practical ethics in antiquity. The most
important lesson, I think, is the need for a general philosophical theory, including basic
metaphysical, epistemological, and moral doctrines that serve as the philosophical foundation of
the proposed practical advice.36 Moreover, philosophical practice should provide some guidance
with respect to the goals that one should have in life. Some of these general goals may well be
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quite different from what is usually considered desirable. But this is in no way a discouraging or
negative feature of philosophical practical advice. The spread of philosophy into the Roman
upper classes in antiquity and the extraordinary appeal and influence of Christianity over the
centuries only show that people need a narrative and a general worldview, as much as they need
concrete guidance with respect to life’s daily challenges. Philosophical practitioners, and
philosophers in general, could, and should, provide both.
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Arnold Davidson, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
20
It is hard to calculate the size of the self-improvement market. A recent study by Marketdata
Enterprises calculates it to eleven billion dollars, noting the potential for significant further
increase.
21
Such works include, indicatively, best-sellers such as Victor Frankl, Man’s Search for
Meaning (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of
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Optimal Experience (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), or David D. Burns, Feeling Good: The
New Mood Therapy (New York: Harper Collins, 1999).
22
See for example, Csikszentmihalyi’s influential “Flow” theory.
23
Such works include, indicatively, best-sellers such as Ken Blanchard, One Minute Manager
(New York: Penguin USA, 1985), Tony Robbins, Unlimited Power (New York: Free Press
1986), Stephen Covey, Seven Habits of Highly Effective People (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1989), and Dale Carnegie, How to Stop Worrying and Start Living (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1984).
24
See, characteristically the long appendix of people that narrate their experiences in Carnegie,
How to Stop Worrying.
25
Contrast this with saints, who Christianity has used for centuries as exemplars. Noble though
the altruism of saints may be, most people believe that they could never imitate them. In such a
case, being told that they should act like an extremely heroic or altruistic person will not have the
desired effect; people will just give up, thinking they cannot be like their ideal.
26
The sporadic mention of famous people and their strategies for success is supplemented by the
frequent use of quotations from them (without much discussion of their context), which are
usually presented as corroboration to the author’s theory (even if their original context is
completely irrelevant).
27
Examples of such practically superficial advice abound. See Robbins, Unlimited Power, p. 29:
“If you want to achieve success, all you need to do is find a way to model those who have
already succeeded.” This is followed by a caveat, which almost negates the previous advice: “My
goal, my outcome for you, is not just that you master the patterns I’m describing here. What you
need to do is develop your own patterns, your own strategies.”
28
For the most part, the advice offered by best-selling self-help books is rather general, although
the authors repeatedly criticise any cookie-cutter advice (compare the case of dieting: every
dietician would claim that no diet is for everyone, while maintaining that theirs is the best for
most). More personalized advice is often advertised as available directly by the author, of course,
at a high cost.
29
Some of the most popular titles include, indicatively, Lou Marinoff’s Plato, Not Prozac:
Applying Philosophy to Everyday Problems (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), Elliot D. Cohen’s
What Would Aristotle Do? Self-Control through the Power of Reason (Amherst, NY:
Prometheus Books, 2003), and Peter Raabe’s Philosophical Counseling: Theory and Practice
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000).
30
As the discipline’s name indicates, part of it is devoted to actual one-on-one counselling, as in
the case of psychotherapy. I will not discuss this aspect of the discipline, although it is intimately
linked to the philosophical practice books.
31
See Christopher Phillips’ Six Questions of Socrates: A Modern-Day Journey of Discovery
(New York: Norton, 2004), Elliot D. Cohen’s What Would Aristotle Do?, and Donald
Robertson’s The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT): Stoic philosophy as
Rational and Cognitive Psychotherapy (London: Karnak, 2010).
32
This is clearly the case in Marinoff, Plato, Not Prozac, where the philosophical summaries
seem to be included in order to demonstrate the philosophical credentials of the author, rather
than to ground some general and coherent moral view.
33
There are, of course, exceptions to this rule. Robertson, Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural
Therapy, for example, provides a rather extensive and well-rounded account of the basic
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principles of Stoicism, relating them to the contemporary practice of cognitive-behavioural
therapy. The work, though, is rather academic in its nature and has more value as a clear history
of ideas than a self-improvement work.
34
A characteristic example of this is Marinoff’s five-step ''PEACE process'': identify the
Problem, take stock of your Emotions, Analyze your options, Contemplate your entire situation
and then reach Equilibrium. This seems to be little more than common sense, something that
anyone could offer as advice and not something with a clear connection to any philosophical
theory.
35
By the admission of philosophical practitioners, as well as academic philosophers,
philosophical practice has been beleaguered by the tendency of some practitioners to view it as
an alternative to or, even worse, an antagonist to psychotherapy. On the related debates, see the
thought-provoking article, “The Socratic Shrink”, by Daniel Duane in the March 21, 2004
edition of The New York Times. Recent developments in the philosophical counselling
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36
In this respect, works in philosophical applied ethics seem to fare better, since they are usually
based on a foundational theory. See for example, Peter Singer’s works on practical ethics, which are
based on Utilitarianism.
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